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Abstract 
The interest of common currency among Asian countries have spurred many events happening for the past few years, notably the 
declaration of Asian Currency Unit in 2006 by Asia Development Bank (ADB). Hence, research papers examining on the integration 
of monetary policies are abundance. However, paper on examining fiscal policy regime and interaction between monetary and fiscal 
policy on ASEAN countries, is lacking. 
 
The success of monetary union relies on the price stability of member nations. However, joining a monetary union means the lost of 
monetary policy sovereignty. Therefore, fiscal policy turns to be the next important tool to maintain price stability. This is reflected 
from the EMU countries after year 1999, where national monetary policies are completely centralized to the European Central Bank 
(ECB). The European System of Central Banks (ESCB) combines unity of decisions with participation of national central banks in the 
decision making process and implementation. Nevertheless, national fiscal policies of the member countries are still in the hands of 
the national governments. 
 
This paper intents to examine the type of fiscal policy regime practiced by ASEAN 5 countries. Using macro-economic data for 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, the interrelationship of government surplus/deficits and liabilities is 
analyzed using Correlation test, Vector Autoregression (VAR) and Impulse response (IR) function to determine whether a Ricardian 
or Non-Ricardian fiscal policy has been implemented. Also, comparison of monetary and fiscal policy interactions between some 
EMU countries and ASEAN 5 are made.  The results indicate  interactions among inter EMU countries and inter ASEAN countries are 
generally comparable.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The creation of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) since the last decade has led 
to a new framework of monetary and fiscal policy in the European Union (EU). It has 
also stimulated a renewed interest in the design, implementation and transmission of 
monetary and fiscal policy in Europe. The successful design and implementation of the 
common monetary policy, in which maneuvered by the ECB, has required a detailed 
knowledge of the transmission mechanisms of monetary policy. With the EMU in place, 
it gives insight into the effects of the common monetary policy on the Euro-area 
economy, since the member country of the EMU has individual fiscal authorities but the 
monetary policy is pursued by a single monetary authority, the ECB. On the other hand, 
the possible diverging effects of the common monetary policy on individual EMU 
countries may, also be observed and studied.  
 
Viewing from another perspective, the study on whether fiscal adjustments have 
significant  effects on monetary union have received considerable interest recently. Fiscal 
adjustments have played a crucial role in the EMU context as the fiscal convergence 
criteria stipulated in the Maastricht Treaty formed an important incentive for EU 
countries to improve their fiscal balances. Due to these reasons, a large number of fiscal 
policy adjustments have been undertaken during the last decade. As a result, many 
countries have made progress on fiscal consolidation and implemented various reforms of 
government spending and taxation.   
 
EMU has stimulated a considerable academic literature on the transmission of monetary 
and fiscal policy in the Euro area. However, similar paper on the this topic, especially on 
ASEAN countries, is lacking. Therefore, it would be very interesting to examine whether 
ASEAN countries will result in the same interaction findings as per in the Euro area. As 
known to all that although the main benefit for monetary union is currency exchange rate 
stabilization, the loss of monetary sovereignty is unavoidable and destined to be the 
major forgo. Therefore, question arise on how far the remaining effective instrument for 
financial intervention, namely fiscal policy, can result in successful intervention? 
Following literatures like Zhang et.al (2004) and  Yuen (2001) that supports Asia and 
ASEAN monetary union base on supply, demand and monetary shocks comovement,  it 
will be interesting to further explore whether ASEAN 5 countries have been using fiscal 
policy as an effective tool to stabilize the countries financial situation.  
 
The aim of this paper is to  examine the nature of ASEAN 5 countries on whether they 
are of  Ricardian or non Ricardian regime. If it is Non Ricardian ( hence will be called 
NR )  regime, fiscal policy is the nominal anchor , while in Ricardian ( hence will be 
called R ) regime, monetary policy plays the role. On top of that, the interactions between 
fiscal and monetary policy when these policies are used as tools of macroeconomic 
stabilization is also analyzed.  
 
This paper is structured to address the followings: (i) R or NR regime for ASEAN 5 (ii) 
Possible clustering of groups of ASEAN 5 base on the regime they belongs (iii) Examine 
the fiscal and monetary interactions among the ASEAN 5 countries.  The paper consists 
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of five sections. Following this introduction, section two layouts literature reviews. 
Section three reviews the methodology and data analysis. Section four discuss the 
analysis results and its implications. The final section concludes. 
 
LITERATURES REVIEW 
 
The formation of a monetary union in Europe and the debate about the Stability and 
Growth Pact make the analysis of fiscal and monetary interactions an especially 
interesting topic. According to Lombardo, G. and Sutherland, A. (2003), it is often 
argued that the loss of monetary policy flexibility due to the merger of currencies 
increases the potential role of fiscal policy as a stabilization tool and increases the need 
for fiscal policy cooperation within Europe. The issue of fiscal and monetary interaction 
also arises at the global level where concern about large fiscal and current account 
imbalances has added to the debate about policy coordination between the major world 
economies. With the widespread shift to a separation of powers between fiscal and 
monetary authorities, the question arises of how the two policies interact when the policy 
makers' objectives differ.  
 
The role of monetary policy in leveraging the economics of a country has been a major 
topic of research for past few years. Much focuses have been on the welfare implications 
of monetary policy regimes, especially in cases where there is some degree of nominal 
rigidity. These welfare effects of monetary policy have also been an important topic in 
open economy research. In this context the role and scope for international monetary 
cooperation has been extensively analyzed. Monetary policy in a monetary union can not 
replicate the flexible price equilibrium but many of the results regarding fiscal policy 
continue to apply to the monetary union case. The successful of a monetary union 
depends on how effective fiscal policy is in counteracting asymmetric real disturbances. 
If an absorption shock, interpreted as a fiscal policy shock, explains a great deal of the 
forecast errors in output, the retention of fiscal policy would be important to stabilize 
output.  
 
Although monetary union does not imply uniform fiscal policy, the Pact for Stability 
and Growth will constrain the countries to follow a more uniform fiscal policy. On top of 
that, Lombardo, G. and Sutherland, A. (2003) found that activist fiscal policy yields 
welfare gains and there are welfare gains to fiscal policy cooperation. But it is also true 
that non-activist fiscal policy can yield higher welfare than non-cooperative fiscal policy 
when the cross country correlation of shocks is strongly negative.  
 
Now, what is the interrelationship between surplus/deficit and fiscal solvency? 
Canzoneri, M. et al. (2001) outlined that if primary surplus/deficit move automatically to 
assure fiscal solvency for any path the price level might take (prices are determined in a 
conventional way, say by money supply and demand), this is called a Ricardian (R) fiscal 
regime, following Woodford (1995). On the other hand, if primary surplus/deficit follow 
an arbitrary process, then the equilibrium path of prices is determined by the requirement 
of fiscal solvency. This means the price level has to rise to satisfy a present value budget 
constraint. With this, it is called a Non-Ricardian (NR) regime. The basic distinction 
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between the two regimes is whether monetary policy or fiscal policy provides the 
nominal anchor for the economy. In R regimes, monetary policy play the anchor role, 
while in NR regimes, fiscal policy becomes the important factor. Canzoneri, M et al 
(1997) show that monetary policy alone can not peg the exchange rate in an NR regime. 
To keep the exchange rate fixed, fiscal policy needs the discipline of an R regime. 
 
Woodford (1995) further illustrated that price level is not pinned down if the central 
bank tries to peg the interest rate in an R regime, but that it would be uniquely determined 
in an NR regime. In addition, the choice of regime affects the way in which fixed 
exchange rate systems can be modeled. He emphasizes that in the so-called "Ricardian" 
policy regime, the fiscal considerations fail to play any role in the price-level 
determination.  
 
Hence, the R and NR regimes can be defined formally in terms of the present value 
constraint. If primary surplus/deficit to GDP ratios are determined by an arbitrary process 
(unrelated to the level of the debt), then nominal income must be in equilibrium .This 
shall be called a NR regime. If the situation in on the contrary,  it is called a R regime. 
This means, nominal income is determined by the needs of fiscal solvency in an NR 
regime; it can be determined in more conventional ways in an R regime.  
 
The Fiscal Theory of Price Level Determination (FTPL )  
 
The "Fiscal Theory of the Price Level" (FTPL) was mainly developed namely by Sims 
(1997) and Woodford (1995). According to the theory,  the price level must assure that the 
real value of nominal government debt equals the present value of expected future fiscal 
surplus/deficit, assuring intertemporal government budget balance (Woodford 1995). This 
approach studies the impact of a fiscal policy that has been termed "non-Ricardian", 
which specifies the time paths of government debt, expenditure and taxes without 
respecting the government's intertemporal solvency constraint such that in equilibrium 
the price level has to adjust in order to ensure government solvency. The introduction of 
this non-Ricardian fiscal policy into an otherwise standard New Keysian monetary sticky 
price model has been shown to alter the stability conditions associated with the central 
bank's interest rate policy. The analysis of monetary and fiscal policy interactions has 
also been extended to open economies and examples include Leith and Wren-Lewis 
(2000), Melitz (2000), van Aarle et al.(2002), Sims (1997), Chamberlin et al. (2002), 
Clausen and Wohltmann (2001) and Beetsma and Jensen (2002). The monetary and fiscal 
policy interactions between two or more countries, especially between the member states 
of EMU are usually the focuses of above research papers.   
 
Following Daniel B.C (2003), the explanation of Ricardian and Non Ricardian regime 
under FTPL is as follow: 
 
 A government’s real primary surplus/deficit inclusive of seigniorage revenue is as 
follows 
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πj  is the inflation rate between periods j - 1 and j. The intertemporal budget constraint 
of equation (4) states simply that the present value of future government surplus/deficit, 
inclusive of seigniorage, must equal the real value of initial debt. The intertemporal 
budget constraint must hold in equilibrium. At a minimum, the existence of equilibrium 
requires that the present-value of  surplus/deficit must be positive whenever there is 
initial positive government debt.  
 
A government is said to be Ricardian if it adjusts surplus/deficit to assure that equation 
(4) holds at any price level (P0). This makes surplus/deficit endogenous to the quantity of 
real government debt. It also implies that intertemporal government budget balance 
places no restrictions on the price level, leaving the price level to be determined by other 
conditions in the economy.  
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Alternatively, a government is non-Ricardian if it chooses present-value surplus/deficit 
independently of the initial stock of real government debt, and hence, independently of 
the initial price level. If the right hand side of equation (4) is independent of the price 
level, then the only way that intertemporal government budget balance can hold is if the 
price level adjusts to assure that it holds. This is the assumption made under the fiscal 
theory of the price level. According to Thams (2007), there seems to be empirical 
evidence that Ricardian fiscal policies are possible and likely. 
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Canzoneri, et al. (2001) pointed out that it is difficult to develop formal tests that 
discriminate between R and NR regimes, since both regimes use exactly the same 
equations to explain a given data set. In a Ricardian regime, the surplus/deficit pays off 
part of the debt and the next period's liabilities fall. In a non-Ricardian regime, there are 
two possibilities. Firstly, an innovation in surplus/deficit is not correlated with future 
surplus/deficit. In this case, the next periods' liabilities will not be affected by the 
innovation in surplus/deficit. Secondly, if an innovation in surplus/deficit is positively 
correlated with future surplus/deficit, the next periods' liabilities will rise. Therefore, 
impulse response functions from a VAR in surplus/deficit and liabilities would help 
differentiate between Ricardian and non-Ricardian regimes. If the next period's liabilities 
fall following a positive innovation surplus/deficit, then we have a Ricardian regime. If 
not, we have a non-Ricardian regime. Note that a negative response can be reconciled 
with a non-Ricardian regime, supposing there is negative correlation in the surplus/deficit 
process at longer horizons and the correlation is strong enough to lower the present value 
of surplus/deficit. 
 
Vector Autoregression (VAR) and Impulse Response Function 
 
Vector Autoregression  (VAR) , first populated by Sims (1980), permits all variables to 
interact linearly with their own and each others current and past values.  Therefore, one 
can determine the quantitative impact that each variable has on its own future value and 
the future values of the other variables. For this paper, an empirical research on the 
monetary and fiscal policy interactions in the Euro-area was done by employing a VAR 
mode. Following Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2001) (referred later as CCD), 
"Ricardian" or "non-Ricardian” fiscal regime of the ASEAN 5 are to be tested so that 
judgment can be made whether the assumption for the FTPL holds in reality. CCD test 
the interactions of two variables, surplus/deficit and government liabilities on US data 
with two different ordering. In the first ordering, (surplus/deficit)/GDP comes first. This 
allows for a contemporaneous effect on liabilities/GDP, as is consistent with an NR 
regime,  where surplus/deficit are exogenous factor. In the second ordering, liabilities/GDP 
comes first. This ordering favours a R regime, because it does not allow 
contemporaneous effect on liabilities/GDP and allows the identification of  shocks to 
(surplus/deficit)/GDP in  R regime.  
 
There are two conditions here which we need to analyze: Using impulse response 
functions, the response of (surplus/deficit)/GDP to innovation in the 
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(surplus/deficit)/GDP has to be observed. Referring to figure 12 by CCD, if the 
surplus/deficit are positively correlated regardless of what ordering, it is hence referred as 
a R regime. But if the surplus/deficit are negatively correlated,  this may be the case of a 
R or NR regime. The second condition will be: If the response of liabilities/GDP to an 
innovation in (surplus/deficit)/ GDP is negative and significant, regardless of the ordering 
used, this would arise naturally in an R regime, as per shown in figure 13. However, if a 
positive shock to surplus/deficit increases the liabilities in the subsequent period, this  
leads to an NR regime  
 
Granger Causality Test 
 
Granger (1969) approach to the question of whether x causes y is to see how much of 
the current y can be explained by past values of y and then to see whether adding lagged 
values of x can improve the explanation. y is said to be Granger-caused by x if x helps in 
the prediction of y, or equivalently if the coefficients on the lagged x 's are statistically 
significant. In our case, Granger-Causality test will tell whether there exists any causality 
between the fiscal and monetary instruments. 
 
We will first undertake this test for monetary and fiscal policy instruments of ASEAN 5 
and then refer to some evidence of the same interactions in the Euro-area from Semmler 
and Zhang (2004). Surplus/deficit and short-term interest rate are used as the fiscal and 
monetary policy instruments respectively. Since according to the FTPL that fiscal regime 
plays a role in the price level determination, we also examine the granger cause between 
surplus/deficit and inflation ( changes in consumer price index). 
 
Following the approach of Semmler and Zhang (2004), ∆S, ∆R and ∆π denote the 
changes in surplus/deficit, short term interest rate and inflation rate respectively and "→" 
stands for "Granger-causes". "Yes" indicates that one variable Granger-causes the other 
and "No" indicates that one variable does not Granger-cause the other.  
 
Data 
 
 The major data sources used in this paper are from IFS (International Financial 
Statistics), which covers ASEAN 5 countries over the 27 years (1980– 2006). 
Surplus/deficit, liabilities (Total net borrowing), short term interest rate and Consumer 
Price Index ( CPI ) are used. For Philippines, the cash balance data is not available. In 
this case we simulate by using both domestic borrowing and foreign borrowing data. 
Some data of Malaysia and Indonesia are obtained from Malaysia Economic Statistics 
Time Series 2005, IMF Staff Country Report: Malaysia Statistical Appendix and 
Indonesia Statistical Appendix.  Both surplus/deficit and liability are scaled down by 
dividing with nominal GDP. All data are annually and seasonally unadjusted.   
 
 The time series properties of the variables have been investigated, and it was found that 
most variables are I(1), based on the Phillips-Peron and KPSS tests. Therefore, the first 
differences of all variables are used to ensure the stationarity of the variables. For 
estimation of the VAR, two lag are chosen, based on Akaike Information Criterion (AIC).  
 7 
 
 For Granger Causality test, the short-term interest rates of ASEAN 5 countries are 
measured by the call money rate and money market rate respectively. ADF unit root 
check at first difference is done for the stated variables with four lags. The test result 
shows that all data series t-statistic values are smaller than the 5% and 10% test critical 
values. Therefore, first differences of these variables are used for the estimation.  
 
 
RESULTS & ANALYSIS 
 
Correlation analysis, VAR estimation and Impulse Response Function Results  
 
We first look at some preliminary results on the correlation of surplus/deficit and 
liability of Indonesia. Figure 1a and Figure 1b  shows the level and first differences 
correlation of the two variables. Figure 1a indicates significant negative correlation 
between the surplus/deficit and liability with  correlation coefficient being -0.8087. This 
suggests that the net borrowing decreases when the surplus/deficit increases. This seems 
to indicate that some kind of Ricardian fiscal policy is at work. From figure 1b, similar 
result is obtained. The correlation coefficient of the first differences of the two variables 
is -0.7839. 
 
The VAR estimation for Indonesia is as below:  
 
∆St = 0.000640 - 0.312 ∆St-1- 0.108 ∆St-2 + 0.124∆Bt-1 + 0.324∆Bt-2      (6) 
 
∆Bt = -0.000435 - 0.232 ∆Bt-1 - 0.182∆Bt-2  - 0.502∆St-1 - 0.262∆St-2     (7) 
 
∆St and ∆Bt  denote the first difference of surplus/deficit and liability respectively. From 
the estimation, there is a case that there exists a negative correlation between the two 
variables.  
 
Figure 7a and 7b show the impulse response function for the two variables with 
different ordering. The figures indicate that one S.D. innovation in ∆St  causes a positive 
but decreasing response of ∆St . From the figure also, one S.D. innovation of ∆St  induces 
a negative response of ∆Bt from period 1 to 2. Beyond period 2 the positive response 
turns to be insignificant. This is reflecting some signs of a Ricardian fiscal regime in the 
period covered.  
 
Next we analyze the case of Malaysia. The correlation of surplus/deficit and liability at 
level and first differences are shown in figure 2a and 2b. In the figures, we observe a 
significant negative correlation between the surplus/deficit and liability with the 
correlation coefficient calculated as -0.6279 for the level, and -0.6787 for the first 
difference case.  
 
∆St = 0.00846 + 0.621 ∆St-1 + 0.238 ∆St-2 + 0.626∆Bt-1 + 0.609∆Bt-2     (8) 
 
∆Bt = 0.0000984 - 0.455 ∆Bt-1 - 0.0598∆Bt-2  - 0.375∆St-1 - 0.228∆St-2    (9) 
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From the VAR estimation, it indicates strong negative correlation between ∆St  and 
∆Bt.. The impulse response function is reflected in figure 8a and 8b with different 
ordering.  From figure 8a,  it is significant that one S.D. innovation of ∆St   induces a 
strong positive response of ∆St , for both ordering. This is similar to the case of 
Indonesia. The response of ∆Bt to ∆St , are also negative up to 4 period before turning to 
become insignificant. Therefore, for Malaysia too, the test results seem to indicate fiscal 
regime has been a Ricardian rather than a non Ricardian.  
 
The analysis on Philippines has been split to 2 portions, due to reason as previously 
stated.  Referring to figure 3a and 3b, correlation coefficient are -0.8219 and -0.7658 
respectively at level and first difference for surplus/deficit over domestic liability , while 
from figure 4a and 4b, the coefficient are -0.7561 and -0.4421respectively at level and 
first difference for surplus/deficit over foreign liability.  
 
∆St = 0.000351 - 0.110 ∆St-1 - 0.466 ∆St-2 + 0.0730∆Bt-1 - 0.573∆Bt-2     (10a) 
 
∆Bt = -0.000936 + 0.0376 ∆Bt-1 - 0.0671∆Bt-2  - 0.490∆St-1 – 0.164∆St-2   (10b) 
 
 
∆St = 0.000351 - 0.183 ∆St-1 + 0.106 ∆St-2 - 0.0730∆Bt-1 + 0.573∆Bt-2     (11a) 
 
∆Bt = 0.000585 - 0.345 ∆Bt-1 - 0.203∆Bt-2  - 0.417∆St-1 – 0.737∆St-2     (11b) 
 
The VAR estimation from equation 10a to 11b indicates some negative correlation 
between ∆St  and ∆Bt. Further analysis on impulse response function from figure 9a and 
9b with first ordering imply that one S.D. innovation of ∆St  induces a positive but 
declining response of ∆St  for the first 2 period. Also from figure 9a, one S.D. innovation 
of ∆St  also induces a negative response of ∆Bt  for the first 2 periods. However, the 
response of ∆Bt  to ∆St. is not significant in figure 9b. 
 
Figure 9c and 9d indicate some same results, that is one S.D. innovation of ∆St  induces 
a positive and declining response of ∆St for the first 2 periods. Looking at the same 
figure, the response of ∆Bt  to ∆St is significant for both figures. Therefore, analysis on 
Philippines indicate that the fiscal regime may be of Ricardian.  
 
Controversially, Singapore exhibits non similar result compare to other ASEAN 
nations. The correlation coefficient between surplus/deficit and liability of level and first 
differences ( as shown in figure 5a and 5b ) are 0.002134 and 0.4800 respectively. This 
weak positive correlation hints that a Non Ricardian regime may be present. On top of 
that, the VAR estimation indicates some positive correlation between ∆St  and ∆Bt.  
 
∆St = 0.00184 - 0.355 ∆St-1+ 0.111 ∆St-2 - 0.0536∆Bt-1 - 0.0216∆Bt-2     (12) 
 
∆Bt = 0.00133 - 1.369 ∆Bt-1 - 0.520∆Bt-2  - 0.510∆St-1 - 0.397∆St-2       (13) 
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The impulse responses in figure 10a and 10b with different ordering indicates that one 
S.D. innovation of ∆St  induces some positive response of ∆St. However, the response of 
∆Bt  to ∆St. are positive in figure 10a. On the contrary, figure 10b indicates negative 
response of  ∆Bt  to ∆St. Therefore, although not clearly indicative yet, the overall tests 
point Singapore’s to be of Non Ricardian regime.  
 
Finally, Thailand’s correlation results resembles Indonesia and Malaysia. Figure 6a and 
6b’s correlation coefficients are -0.9154 and -0.7435 at level and first difference 
respectively. The result of the VAR estimation in equation (14) and (15) indicates also 
moderate negative correlation between ∆St  and ∆Bt..  
 
∆St = 0.00215 + 0.582 ∆St-1- 0.124∆St-2 + 0.365∆Bt-1 - 0.221∆Bt-2       (14) 
 
∆Bt = -0.00264 - 0.368 ∆Bt-1 - 0.312∆Bt-2  - 0.509∆St-1 - 0.344∆St-2      (15) 
 
From the  impulse response function reflected in figures 11a and 11b, one S.D. 
innovation of ∆St  induces a positive response of ∆St up to 4 periods before the response 
becomes insignificant regardless of ordering . From another view in figure 11b, it 
indicate one S.D. innovation of ∆St  induces also a negative response of ∆Bt  up to 5 
periods. Therefore, Thailand can be categorized as a country that practice Ricardian 
regime.  
 
In general, the correlation analysis, VAR estimation and impulse response functions 
favors the conclusion that ASEAN 5 except Singapore are prone to have implemented a 
Ricardian rather than Non Ricardian regime in the past decades.  
 
Fiscal and Monetary Policy Interactions Test Results  
 
From table 1, all 5 countries reflect changes in surplus/deficit does not Granger-cause 
changes in the short-term interest rate, and ∆S does not Granger-cause ∆π either, except 
for Singapore and Thailand. The change in the short-term interest rate does not Granger-
cause the surplus/deficit change except for Indonesia and Thailand. Results of change in 
inflation rate Granger-causes ∆S are different among the 5 countries. ∆π does Granger-
cause ∆S in the case of Indonesia for both 2 and 4 lags. For Singapore and Thailand, ∆S 
Granger-causes ∆π when 4 lags is used for estimation. It should be noted that the results 
may be sensitive to the periods covered. 
 
In general, the Granger-Causality tests indicate that the causality between the 
surplus/deficit, interest rate and inflation rate is asymmetric: The surplus/deficit does not 
Granger-cause the interest, while the interest rate and inflation may, to some extent, 
Granger-cause the surplus/deficit. This suggests that fiscal policy is to some degree, 
affected by monetary policy. These findings, to some extend, resembles Semmler and 
Zhang (2004) observation on Germany, France and Italy, as per in table 2. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
This paper explores whether ASEAN 5 have been practicing Ricardian or Non 
Ricardian regime. We first present the correlation coefficients between surplus/deficit 
and liability, in level and first difference. Next, we undertake estimation using VAR and 
obtained the regression model. Finally, impulse response functions were generated to 
study the effect of first difference of surplus/deficit on the first difference of liability and 
vice versa for ASEAN 5. This three tests of fiscal regimes indicate that the four countries 
of Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand have implemented Ricardian fiscal 
policy in the covered period. Singapore, however, has shown signs of practicing Non 
Ricardian regime for the past two decades.  
 
We also undertake Granger-Causality tests to examine monetary and fiscal policy 
interactions. All ASEAN 5 countries indicate change in the surplus/deficit does not 
Granger-cause the change in the short-term interest rate, and change in surplus/deficit 
does not Granger-cause change in inflation rate either, except for Singapore and 
Thailand. Although surplus/deficit does not Granger-cause interest rate, interest rate and 
inflation may, to some extent, Granger-cause the surplus/deficit. In short, the Granger-
Causality tests indicate that the causality between the surplus/deficit, interest rate and 
inflation rate is asymmetric. 
 
Both results above have reveal some useful information for ASEAN 5 countries prior to 
monetary union consideration and possible implementation in the future. Although 
preliminary analysis has shown that Singapore was not part of the group that practice 
Ricardian regime, further analysis have to be made to detail out the rational and 
embedded elements behind.     
 
EMU, so far, has been successful and one major reason of it is strong political 
commitment from member governments. ASEAN 5 will have to reference this as the 
foundation for future economic integration, despites on the fact that symmetrical of 
monetary shocks and similarity in fiscal regime are important. If political drive to move 
forward from each of the member country is not propulsive enough, this shall be the 
major stumbling block of monetary union. 
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Correlation coefficient are -0.8087 and -0.7839 respectively 
 
Figure 1a & 1b: Surplus/deficit and liability ( net borrowing ) and first difference of 
surplus/deficit and liability ( net borrowing ) of Indonesia  
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Correlation coefficient are -0.6279 and -0.6787 respectively 
 
Figure 2a & 2b: Surplus/deficit and liability ( net borrowing ) and first difference of 
surplus/deficit and liability ( net borrowing ) of Malaysia   
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Correlation coefficient are -0.8219 and -0.7658 respectively 
 
Figure 3a & 3b: Surplus/deficit and liability ( domestic borrowing ) and first difference of 
surplus/deficit and liability ( net borrowing ) of Philippines  
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Correlation coefficient are -0.7561 and -0.4421 respectively 
 
Figure 4a & 4b: Surplus/deficit and liability ( foreign borrowing ) and first difference of 
surplus/deficit and liability ( net borrowing ) of Philippines 
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Correlation coefficient are 0.002134 and 0.4800 respectively  
 
Figure 5a & 5b: Surplus/deficit and liability ( net borrowing ) and first difference of 
surplus/deficit and liability ( net borrowing ) of Singapore 
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Correlation coefficient are -0.9154 and -0.7435 respectively 
 
Figure 6a & 6b: Surplus/deficit and liability ( net borrowing ) and first difference of 
surplus/deficit and liability ( net borrowing ) of Thailand  
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Figure 7a: Response to one S.D. innovation (Indonesia) with ordering ∆St , ∆Bt 
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Figure 7b: Response to one S.D. innovation (Indonesia) with ordering ∆Bt , ∆St  
 
 
 
 
 
 17 
-.03
-.02
-.01
.00
.01
.02
.03
.04
.05
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
-.04
-.03
-.02
-.01
.00
.01
.02
.03
.04
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 
            Response of ∆S to ∆S                  Response of ∆B to ∆S 
Figure 8a: Response to one S.D. innovation (Malaysia) with ordering ∆St , ∆Bt 
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Figure 8b: Response to one S.D. innovation (Malaysia) with ordering ∆Bt , ∆St 
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Figure 9a: Response to one S.D. innovation (Philippines) with ordering ∆St , ∆Bt  
(domestic borrowing) 
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Figure 9b: Response to one S.D. innovation (Philippines) with ordering ∆Bt , ∆St 
(domestic borrowing) 
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Figure 9c: Response to one S.D. innovation (Philippines) with ordering ∆St , ∆Bt 
(foreign borrowing) 
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Figure 9d: Response to one S.D. innovation (Philippines) with ordering ∆Bt , ∆St 
(foreign borrowing) 
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Figure 10a: Response to one S.D. innovation (Singapore) with ordering ∆St , ∆Bt 
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Figure 10b: Response to one S.D. innovation (Singapore) with ordering ∆Bt , ∆St 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 21 
-.010
-.005
.000
.005
.010
.015
.020
.025
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
-.020
-.015
-.010
-.005
.000
.005
.010
.015
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
              
             Response of ∆S to ∆S                 Response of ∆B to ∆S 
Figure 11a: Response to one S.D. innovation (Thailand) with ordering ∆St , ∆Bt 
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Figure 11b: Response to one S.D. innovation (Thailand) with ordering ∆Bt , ∆St 
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           First order                     Second order 
 
Figure 12: Response of (surplus/deficit)/GDP to (surplus/deficit)/GDP in first order and 
second order 
Source: Canzoneri, Matthew B, et.al (2001) 
 
  
First order                     Second order 
 
Figure 13: Response of liabilities/GDP to (surplus/deficit)/GDP in first order and second 
order 
Source: Canzoneri, Matthew B, et.al (2001) 
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Table 1: Granger-Causality test results for ASEAN 5.  
 
Country  ∆S → ∆R ∆R → ∆S ∆S → ∆π ∆π → ∆S 
Indonesia No* No**  Yes* Yes**  No* Yes**  Yes* Yes**  
Malaysia No* No**  No* No**  No* No**  No* No**  
Philippines No* No**  No* No**  No* No**  No* No** 
Singapore No* No**  No* No**  No* Yes**  No* No**  
Thailand No* No**  Yes* Yes**  Yes* Yes**  No* No**  
* means 2 lags is used and ** means 4 lags is used for test 
 
Table 2 : Granger-Causality test results for Germany, France and Italy.  
 
Country  ∆S → ∆R ∆R → ∆S ∆S → ∆π ∆π → ∆S 
Germany No* No**  No* Yes**  Yes* No**  No* No**  
France Yes* Yes**  No* Yes**  Yes* No**  Yes* No**  
Italy No* No**  Yes* Yes**  No* No**  No* Yes** 
* means 4 lags is used and ** means 8 lags is used for test 
Source: Semmler and Zhang (2004) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
